We deal with the problem of outsourcing the debt for a big investment, according two situations: either the firm outsources both the investment (and the associated debt) and the exploitation to a private consortium, or the firm supports the debt and the investment but outsources the exploitation. We prove the existence of Stackelberg and Nash equilibria between the firm and the private consortium, in both situations. We compare the benefits of these contracts. We conclude with a study of what happens in case of incomplete information, in the sense that the risk aversion coefficient of each partner may be unknown by the other partner.
for several reasons. In some cases, banks will simply not allow a company to borrow enough money to sustain a very expensive project. But even if it is not the case, since the debt level appears on the company's accounts, issuing too much debt will affect the opinion and confidence of investors, and in particular deteriorate its rating. This can lead to a higher credit spread when issuing new bonds, difficulties to increase the capital of the firm, a drop of the company's stock price, dissatisfaction of shareholders or in the worst case, bankruptcy. We can cite some concrete examples where the dilemma between investing directly or resorting to outside investment can occur: owning or renting offices or factories, owning or leasing trucks, trains or planes, some industrial machines or some office materials (such as computers).
Therefore we will consider in this paper the problem of outsourcing from the debt point of view. Since the question of outsourcing some operations has already been widely studied and our aim is only to study the relevance of outsourcing an investment in order to reduce the debt of a firm (or economic agent), we will compare two situations where the operations are always outsourced. In the first one, the firm outsources both the investment/debt and the operations, while in the second one, the firm supports the debt and the investment but outsources the operations.
In [5] , Iossa, Martimort and Pouyet give some results on the comparison of the costs and benefits associated to PPP. Hillairet and Pontier [4] propose a study on PPP and their relevance, assuming the eventuality of a default of the counterparty, but they do not take into account the government debt aversion. However, the attractivity for government of PPP contracts relies obviously on the short term opportunity gain to record infrastructure assets out of the government's book. To our knowledge, there does not exist any references in Mathematics area. In Economics, a narrow strand of literature is dedicated to the discussion of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) concession contracts, which is a frequent form of PPP. Under BOT contracts the private sector builds and operates an infrastructure project for a well defined concession period and then transfers it to public authorities. The attractiveness of BOT contracts to governments stems from the possibility to limit governmental spending by shifting the investment costs to a private consortium. In [1] , Auriol and Picard discuss the choice of BOT contracts when governments and consortia do not share the same information about the cost parameter during the project life. They summarize the government's financial constraint by its "shadow" cost of public funds, which reflects the macro-economic constraints that are imposed on national governments' surplues and debt levels by supranational institutions such as the I.M.F. Using linear demand functions and uniform cost distributions, they compute theoretical values of shadow costs that would entice governments to choose BOT concessions contracts. Our approach is different from the modelization and the resolution point of view.
The present paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we set the problem of outsourcing between two firms and we define the optimization problems in Situation 1, in which the firm outsources both the investment/debt and the operations, and in Situation 2 , in which the firm supports the debt and the investment but outsources the operations. Section 3 provides the main results. Section 4 is devoted to the proofs of existence and characterization of Nash and Stackelberg equilibria in Situation 1, then Section 5 does the same in Situation 2. Section 6 concerns the proofs of the comparison results between the two situations and the results obtained in incomplete information.
Problem formulation 2.1 Costs and revenue
Consider two firms. Firm I is the one who wants to reduce its debt and therefore considers the possibility of outsourcing an investment to a second firm J. In any case, firm J is the one that will support the operational cost of the project, on the time horizon T . Let (C o t ) such that the operational cost on the time-interval [t, t + dt] is C 0 t dt, be given by : C o t = µ t − ϕ(e t ) − δψ(a), (2.1) where • µ t is the "business as usual" cost, such that Eµ t represents the "average" benchmark cost (it takes into account the price of commodities, employees, rents...). We assume that µ t is not dt × dP a.e. constant, that there exists k > 0 such that µ t ≥ k (for all t, P-a.s) and that (2.2) ∀λ ∈ R, E T 0 e λµs ds < +∞.
Notice that this implies that the function λ → E T 0 e λµs ds is infinitely differentiable. For instance, we may consider that µ t = µ(t, P t ) where µ is a function bounded from below by k and also bounded from above, and P t is a Markov process with the following dynamics: dP t = diag(P t )σ(t, P t )(θ(t, P t )dt + dW t ), (2.3) where W is a d-dimensional Brownian motion, θ : R + × R d → R d and σ : R + × R d → R d×d are measurable in time and Lipschitz in space uniformly in time, θ is bounded.
• e t is non-negative and represents the effort made in order to reduce the operational cost between t and t+ dt, such as logistics improvements, research and development, maintenance or more efficient or less workers, and will in general have a social impact for firm I,
• δ ∈ R represents the impact of the quality of the investment on the reduction of operational costs. We do not impose any restriction on the sign of delta, since, as suggested in [5] , both signs can make sense depending on the situation. Indeed, when constructing a building, using more expensive material usually bring less maintenance costs and therefore a positive delta. On the contrary, for a hospital, using more sophisticated (and expensive) machines can bring bigger maintenance costs and a negative delta.
• a = A T where A ≥ 0 is the effort done on the (initial) quality of the investment, improving the social value of the project. Depending on δ, A affects positively, negatively or does not affect the operational cost. The reason why we work with a instead of A is that a has the same dimension as the effort e t ,
• ϕ : R + → R + and ψ : R + → R + are C 1 , increasing and strictly concave functions, satisfying the Inada conditions ϕ ′ (0) = +∞ and ϕ ′ (∞) = 0, ψ ′ (0) = +∞ and ψ ′ (∞) = 0. We also assume that ϕ(
for x → 0 for technical reasons and to make the computations lighter even if we could relax it.
The function e is a control for firm J, while a is a control for the firm that supports the investment, I or J depending on the situation. In a sense, µ represents the trend on the cost. The minimal investment required by the project is C 0 > 0 and the total investment is the sum C 0 + A of this minimal investment and of the initial effort. Introducing D = C0 T , the total investment is equal to (D + a)T . The total investment is assumed to be entirely covered by issuing a debt with horizon T at time 0. To take into account the possibility that the cost of borrowing is in general not the same for different firms, we denote the respective non-negative constant interest rates of firms I and J by r I and r J . For t ∈ [0, T ), the amount to be reimbursed by the borrower K ∈ {I, J} between t and t + dt is (1 + r K )(D + a)dt. Finally, we need to add the remaining costs coming from the effort e t as well as the maintenance costs denoted by m t :
The maintenance costs m t are non-negative and will have a social impact for firm I.
Since firm I gives to firm J either a rent or the right to exploit the project on [0, T ], in both cases we can consider a process R t which corresponds to the endowment for firm J and the rent or shortfall for firm I, on [t, t + dt]. This process is computed using a reasonably simple rule, decided at t = 0 and subject to a control of firm I. In reality, in such contracts, the endowment can be indexed on the price of commodities in the case of transportation or on a real-estate index for the rent of a building. Since firm I wants to have a project of good quality as well as a well maintained project, we assume that R t is non-negative and depends on both C o t and the maintenance cost in the following way: (2.5) with α ≥ 0, β ∈ R, γ ≥ 0 and g is a C 1 , increasing and strictly concave function on R + , such that g ′ (0) = ∞ and g ′ (∞) = 0. Moreover, we assume that
The constants α, β and γ are controls of firm I. We do not put any randomness in the coefficients α, β and γ of R since we consider that they are defined at time t = 0 by a contract between firms I and J. All the randomness in R comes from the operational cost term C o t . Still, this model allows for an indexation on a benchmark such as the price of commodities or inflation through this dependence with respect to operational costs.
Optimization problems
Let ρ be the discount factor that relates the preferences for today of both 1 firms I and J. We assume that the risk aversions of firm I and J are represented respectively by the exponential utility functions U (x) = −e −ux and V (x) = −e −vx , x ∈ R, with u, v > 0. We consider two different situations: in Situation 1, firm J supports the debt and takes care of the exploitation; its controls are a, e and m, whereas the controls of firm I are α, β and γ. In Situation 2, firm J only takes care of the exploitation, its controls are e and m, whereas the controls of firm I are a, α, β and γ. Firm I is the one that chooses between the two situations. The optimization problems for firm J respectively in Situation 1 and 2 are v 1 = sup (a,e,m) J 1 (a, e, m) and v 2 = sup (e,m) J 2 (e, m) respectively, where:
denoting the probability measure η(ds) := e −ρs
In these optimization problems, we have assumed that the controls of firm I are given (they have no reason to be the same in the two cases). We look for controls in the following admissible sets : a is a non-negative constant, e and m are adapted and non-negative processes. The eventuality that firm J does not accept the contract will be taken into account in the constraints of the optimization problem for firm I.
On the other hand, we consider that the project has an initial "social" value b a (a) for firm I, and a good maintenance also represents a social benefit b m (m). The benefits of the efforts on operational costs are modelled through the function b e . We also introduce a penalization function f representing the aversion for debt emission of firm I. Those functions satisfy the following hypotheses
• b e : R + → R + is a C 1 , increasing and concave function, such that (
• f is an increasing and strictly convex function, satisfying f ′ (∞) = ∞.
Therefore we write the optimization problem for firm I in both situations as u 1 = sup (α,β,γ) I 1 (α, β, γ) and u 2 = sup (a,α,β,γ) I 2 (a, α, β, γ) where:
Hypotheses on b a and f imply that
Finally we assume that F ′ (0) > 0, possibly infinite. The admissible sets are: -in Situation 1, α ≥ 0, β ∈ R, γ ≥ 0 and such that
The constraint ensures that firm J will accept the contract, since it is better or equal for it than doing nothing.
Depending on the power balance between the two firms, different kinds of equilibria can be relevant. In fact, we will look for the existence of two different equilibria between the two firms: a Nash equilibrium and a Stackelberg equilibrium where I is the leader. The first situation corresponds for example to an industrial group which wants to outsource its trucks/trains to a big transport company. The second one corresponds for example to a government which outsources the construction of a stadium.
Remark 2.1 We could also consider Stackelberg equilibria with firm J as the leader, which corresponds for instance to a small firm wanting to outsource to a big company. In Situation i ∈ {1, 2}, since µ s − ϕ(e s ) − δψ(a) > 0, I i is decreasing w.r.t. β, while J i is increasing w.r.t. β. Therefore if firm J is the leader, for any choice of its controls, firm I's optimal controls will always saturate the constraint J i ≥ V (0), and therefore we obtain a Stackelberg equilibrium. As a consequence, in this framework, Stackelberg equilibria with firm J leader is not relevant from an economical perspective.
Main results
The best responses of firm J to given controls of firm I turn out to be easily derived. That is why we first present them, before stating our main results concerning Nash and Stackelberg equilibria where these best responses appear. The proofs of the main results are postponed in Sections 4, 5 and 6. 3.1 Best responses of firm J in Situations 1 and 2
Let us first consider Situation 1 and suppose that (α, β, γ) is given in R + × R × R + . For firm J the optimization problem is ω by ω and t by t, and since U is increasing it writes:
Since ψ, ϕ and g are strictly concave, the first order conditions characterize the points maximizing each function between braces and, with the convention that (φ ′ ) −1 (∞) = 0 for φ = ψ, ϕ, g, we have :
Let us now consider Situation 2 and suppose that (a, α, β, γ) is given. Similarly we obtain that
To describe the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, we introduce the continuous mappings C e : R → R and B e : R × R + → R defined for any e ∈ R + by
If e is taken as the optimal effort e * (β), we denote C e * (β) and B e * (β) respectively as
Nash equilibria
In the case of the Nash equilibria, we will see that the optimal β is v u+v and the mapping B e and B defined in (3.4) and (3.6) simplify as :
To describe the Nash equilibria, we also need the following technical results about the function g.
Proposition 3.1 In Situation 1, there exists an infinite number of Nash equilibria, namely the vectors (α,β,γ,ê,m,â) defined byβ
The corresponding optimal values for firms J and I are respectively V (0) and
with C(β) and B(β,m) defined in (3.5) and (3.8).
Remark 3.1
• Although there exists an infinite number of Nash equilibria, the controls β, e and a are the same in all these equilibria.
• It is natural to wonder whether there exists in Situation 1 a Nash equilibrium among the infinite family of such equilibria exhibited in Proposition 3.1 which maximizesÎ 1 . This function depends on the Nash equilibrium only through the term b m (m) −m which has to be maximized. The functionm → b m (m) −m being concave, it admits a unique maximum on the intervalM 1 (r J ) wherem associated with a Nash equilibrium varies.
Moreover, in Situation 2, there exists an infinite number of Nash equilibria namely the vectors (α,β,γ,ê,m,â) defined bŷ (3.11) and such that C(
Moreover,α +γ > 0 and if δ ≥ 0, thenâ > 0 and is unique for eachm. The corresponding optimal values for firms J and I are respectively V (0) and
Remark 3.2 Notice that the order the different controls are determined is important, since some of them depend on the other ones. Indeedβ depends on no other control and therefore should be determined first, leading to the value ofê. Then one should fixm, in order to haveγ, which allows then to determineâ, and once this is done, we can findα. Althougĥ α andγ essentially play the same role, the fact thatγ only depends onm makes this order important. If one choosesα first, then the determination ofâ is not clear, since thenâ depends onm, whilem depends onâ andα.
The following Proposition gives the monotonicity of the optimal initial effortâ 1 in Situation 1 (respectivelyâ 2 in Situation 2), function of the interest rate r J (respectively r I ).
Proposition 3.3
The application r J →â 1 (r J ) is non increasing. At least in case δ > 0, the application r I →â 2 (r I ) is non increasing.
LetM 2 (r I ) denote the set ofm ≥ 0 for which there exists (α,β,γ,ê,â) such that (α,β,γ,ê,m,â) is a Nash equilibrium in Situation 2. By Proposition 3.2 and Remark 3.1, [0,
. We now compare the respective optimal valuesÎ 1 (m) andÎ
. In case of rate r I satisfying (3.12)
we haveÎ 2 (m) ≥Î 1 (m) and the better contract for firm I is the second one, meaning debt issuance.
Condition (3.12) has a clear economical interpretation. The right-hand-side does not depend on r I . Therefore for a fixed r J , debt issuance is the best choice for firm I as soon as its interest rate r I is small enough. Note the impact of the function f modeling its debt aversion : the larger f , the smaller the threshold on r I in condition (3.12).
. In case of rate r I satisfying
and the better contract for firm I is the first one, meaning outsourcing.
The economical interpretation of condition (3.13) is also natural. Indeed, the right-hand-sides of the inequalities do not depend on r I whereas the left-hand-sides are increasing functions of r I . Hence (3.13), leading to optimality of outsourcing for firm I, is satisfied as soon as its interest rate r I is large enough. Unfortunately, we have not been able to check that the second condition (3.14) for optimality is satisfied for large r I . Besides, we see that the more convex f is, the smaller is the threshold on r I in the first inequality of condition (3.13).
Stackelberg equilibria
Depending on Situation 1 or 2 and on the sign of δ, the optimal β will be characterized as solution of different equations.
To specify those equations, we need to introduce the functions
where k(β) is a positive function of β defined as follows:
uβ µs−ϕ•e * (β) ds with e * (β) and a * (β) defined in (3.1) and C(β) in (3.5). We consider the following equations (3.19) h
Proposition 3.6 In Situation 1, there exists at least one Stackelberg equilibrium with firm I as the leader. Moreover, if there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium (ê,m,â,α,β,γ) withα > 0, then it is characterized by :
If δ > 0 thenβ is a solution of (3.20) and is less than v u+v . If δ < 0 thenβ is a solution either of (3.19) (that is less than v u+v ) or of (3.21) (that is bigger than one).
Proposition 3.7 In Situation 2, there exists at least one Stackelberg equilibrium with firm I as the leader. Moreover, if there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium (ê,m,â,α,β,γ) withα > 0, then it satisfies:
β is a solution of (3.19),ê = (ϕ ′ )
, where the mappings C and B are defined by (3.5)- (3.6) .
According to the next Lemma, Equation (3. 19) which appears in the characterization ofβ whenα > 0 in both Situations 1 and 2 always admits a solution. 
Incomplete information
In this section we consider the previous equilibrium problems when the firms do not have a perfect knowledge of the preferences of the other firm. More precisely, we still assume that the firms' utility functions are U (x) = −e −ux and V (x) = −e −vx respectively, but firm I perceives v as a random variable that we will denote V (and knows its distribution), which is independent of µ and takes values in (0, +∞), and firm J perceives u as a random variable that we will denote U (and knows its distribution), which is independent of µ as well. According to Section 3.1, firm J optimal controls are functions of the controls β, γ fixed by firm I that do not depend on the risk aversion parameters u. Therefore, equations (3.1) and (3.2) still hold in incomplete information and incomplete information on the risk aversion parameter u has no impact on the equilibria. In contrast, the uncertainty on the parameter v has an impact as the acceptation of the contract by firm J depends on it. To model the social need of the investment, we introduce a (social) penalty p ∈ R ∪ {+∞} that firm I gets if firm J does not accept the contract.
Stackelberg equilibrium, firm I is leader
We first introduce the events A i , i = 1, 2 : "firm J accepts the contract" in Situation i. The optimization problem for firm I is (3.22) in Situation 1 and in Situation 2, it becomes :
The functions
where, e * , m * and a * have been defined in (3.1), are the social gain that firm I respectively gets in Situations 1 and 2 if firm J accepts the contract. Notice that the supremum is taken with −p to modelize the possibility for firm J not to enter the game and that p = +∞ corresponds to the case where firm I absolutely wants that firm J accepts the contract. In order to characterize the acceptance set A i , we introduce
According to hypothesis (2.2), the functions v →J i (v, · · · ) are differentiable. Since their derivatives v → ∂ vJ i are strictly decreasing, the functionsJ i (v, · · · ) are strictly convex and continuous. Taking into account the admissible conditions (2.7), (2.8) in the case of power utility functions , firm J accepts the contract if and only ifJ i (V, .) ≤ 1, thus A i = {ω;J i (V (ω), .) ≤ 1}. We define the value function of the problem with complete information that firm J's risk aversion is equal to v
We have the following result:
Proposition 3.8 Let
We have w Proposition 3.8 has an important interpretation. Indeed, it means that in order to solve (3.22) or (3.23), firm I first solves its problem for any given v as if the information was complete or in other words as in Section 3.3, and then "chooses" the level v that would bring the greatest social expectation in (3.26). 
Nash equilibrium
We did not succeed in finding sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium with incomplete information. Nevertheless, we obtain necessary conditions that are similar for both situations: 
(δ(1−β)) + . Ifv < +∞, thenĉ is a Nash equilibrium for the problem with complete information and risk aversionv for firm J and for each v <v, P(V ≤ v) < P(V ≤v). Ifv = +∞, then for each v ∈ (0, +∞), P(V ≤ v) < 1. (v 1 , . . . , v n ) of elements of (0, +∞) such that n k=1 P(V = v k ) = 1, one deduces that if there exists a Nash equilibrium for the problem with incomplete information, then ∃i such thatv = v i . 
Remark 3.3 If there is a vector
To prove the proposition, we need the following lemma : 
We will first solve the problem of maximization of K on E, forgetting about the constraints α ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0, and we will then see that it allows to solve the original constrained problem. Let us therefore consider the following problem: sup (α,β,γ)∈E K(α, β, γ). Since K is concave and E is a closed convex set, the first order conditions for the Lagrangian associated to this problem are also sufficient conditions. The Lagrangian is given by: 
Hypothesis (2.2) implies that L is differentiable and
is increasing w.r.t. α, β and γ. Therefore, at an interior point of E denoted (α, β, γ), for sufficiently small ε > 0, for example (α, β −ε, γ) is still in E, while K(α, β −ε, γ) > K(α, β, γ), so that (α, β, γ) cannot be a maximum of K. Therefore we also have: This equation is equivalent to h(uβ) − h(v(1 − β) = 0 which admits the unique solution β * = v u+v ∈ (0, 1) (cf. Lemma 4.1). Using then (4.6), we compute:
.
We have E 
Since C e (β * ) − u u+v δψ(a) + e + m + (1 + r J )(D + a) > 0, the set {(α, γ) ∈ [0, +∞) 2 , α + γg(m) = C e (β * ) − u u+v δψ(a) + e + m + (1 + r J )(D + a)} = ∅, and therefore the optimal (α, β, γ) for the problem: sup
are exactly the elements of 
Nash equilibrium Proof of Lemma 3.1
The function g is assumed to be increasing, strictly concave and such that g ′ (0) = ∞, g ′ (∞) = 0 and (2.6) holds. Since g is increasing and concave, we compute for any x ∈ [0, m]:
Since g is strictly concave and g ′ (∞) = 0, g ′ (m) > 0 and we have for m ≥ x:
By (2.6) and monotonicity of g, for x > m 0 , g(x) > 0 and lim m→+∞
(g ′ (m)) 2 has the same sign as g(m) by strict concavity of g, one easily concludes. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.1
The characterization conditions for a Nash equilibrium follows from optimal expressions (3.1) and Proposition 4.1. Thus, the only thing to check is that there exists an infinite number of solutions. On the one hand, (µ s − ϕ(ê) − δψ(â)) > 0 and (1 + r J )(D +â) +ê > 0, thus
Therefore there exists infinitely many couples (α, m) ∈ R 2 + such that
Stackelberg equilibrium in Situation 1, firm I is leader
We give in this subsection the proof of Proposition 3.6. Firm I has to find (α, β, γ) maximising
Since the inverse function of m
from R + onto itself, the maximisers are the triplets (α, β, γ * (m)) with (α, β, m) maximising
under the constraint
where, by a slight abuse of notations, we still denote by I 1 and J 1 the functions obtained by the change of variable (α, β, γ) → (α, β, m). We also recall the application C : R → R defined in (3.5) (4.8) the optimization problem for firm I then writes:
We will prove the existence of a maximizer for this problem, and therefore of a Stackelberg equilibrium, by checking that we can restrict the set A to a compact subset. Notice first that A = ∅. In fact, one can easily check that for any β ∈ R and m ≥ 0, one can choose α large enough so that (α, β, m) ∈ A. To prove this lemma, we need the following result which applies to functions ϕ and ψ :
Lemma 4.3 For any increasing, strictly concave C 1 and bounded function φ, φ
Proof. Integrating by parts, we get for x ≥ 1, (4.9)
where φ ′′ (du) denotes the negative measure equal to the second order distribution derivative of φ. Since φ is increasing and concave, the terms −xφ ′ (x) and uφ ′′ (du) and φ(x) are monotonic and bounded, they admit finite limits when x → ∞. By (4.9), xφ ′ (x) admits a finite limit as well, denoted ℓ. Since φ is bounded, φ ′ is integrable on [1, +∞) , which implies ℓ = 0 and gives the result. Let x = (φ ′ ) −1 (y). When y → 0, x goes to ∞ and y(φ ′ ) −1 (y) = φ ′ (x)x goes to 0. For any β ≥ 1, e * (β) = 0 and since I 1 is decreasing w.r.t. α, we have for (α, m) ∈ R 2 + ,
= 0 for β ≥ 1 and the result is obvious. 
Lemma 4.4 Let
The supremum over A is attained if and only if the supremum over B ∪ C is attained.
Proof. Since I 1 is decreasing w.r.t. α and J 1 is continuous, if α > 0 and J 1 (α, β, m) < 1, then there exists ε > 0 such that I 1 (α − ε, β, m) > I 1 (α, β, m), while J 1 (α − ε, β, m) ≤ 1. Therefore the supremum over A ∩ {α > 0} is the same as the supremum overB :
Noticing then that A is closed and that B := Cl(B), we easily conclude. 2
Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6 are devoted to the supremum over B. In Lemma 4.5, we check that the supremum is attained on a compact subset K not depending on v > 0. In Lemma 4.6, we derive optimality conditions satisfied by a maximizer with positive α.
Lemma 4.5 The function k(β) defined in (3.18), which depends on v > 0 through the function C(β) defined in (3.5), satisfies k(β) → ∞ uniformly in v > 0 when β → −∞. There existsβ such that k(β) is bounded from below by a positive constant uniformly in v > 0 for β ∈ (−∞,β]. Moreover, in set B, α is a continuous function of (β, m) and there exists a compact K ⊂ B not depending on v > 0 such that sup B I 1 = sup K I 1 . In particular the supremum on B is attained.
Proof. Let us consider sup B I 1 . Recall the definition of C(β) given by (3.5) . Since J 1 (α, β, m) = 1 on B, we know that
so that (4.14)
In I 1 (α(β, m), β, m), we have b a (a * (β)) minus the product of two positive functions, the first one depending only on m, the second one, k, only on β.
bounded from below by a positive constant c and goes to infinity when m goes to infinity. Let us now examine k. Using Jensen's inequality in (3.5) we get
and using again Jensen's inequality and e u(1+rJ )(D+a * (β)) ≥ 1, we see that
Using Eµ s ≥ ϕ(x) + δ + ψ(y) for any x, y, we deduce that
e −ρs ds where the right-hand-side does not depend on v > 0 and goes to infinity when
2 Lemma 4.6 Let (α,β,m) withα > 0 be such that the maximum on B is attained at (α,β,m). Then necessarily
and there are two different cases, depending on the sign of δ :
with S and S defined in (3.16) and (3.17).
Proof. Let (α,β,m) be such that the maximum on B is attained at (α,β,m). 
The computation ofβ is more tricky and depends on the externality δ.
1) δ > 0:
Thus using the function h defined in (3.15)
As seen in Lemma 4.1, for β ≥ 1, h(uβ) − h(v(1 − β)) > 0, thusβ < 1 and we study the equation (3.20)
The left hand side is positive for β > 2) δ < 0:
Thus,
Thus the optimal β on B is either the solution of equation (3.19 ) (which is less than v u+v ) or the solution of
2 The next lemma is devoted to the optimisation over C.
Lemma 4.7
The supremum of (α, β, m) → I 1 (α, β, m) is attained on C defined in (4.13).
Proof. Let us then consider sup C I 1 . We have α = 0 on C. Since g is concave and positive for sufficiently large m, and
g ′ (m) is decreasing for sufficiently large m. Thus there is a constantm ∈ R not depending on v > 0 such that for any β ∈ R, m → I 1 (0, β, m) is decreasing for m ≥m. Therefore, writing
the supremum of I 1 over C is attained iff the supremum of I 1 over C 1 ∪ C 2 is attained.
* (β) = +∞ and a * (β) ≥ 0, while m ∈ [0,m], this implies that there exists β ∈ R not depending on v > 0, such that C 1 ⊂ {0} × [β,β] × [0,m],β being defined in Lemma 4.2. Since C 1 is closed, it is compact and therefore the supremum over C 1 is attained.
(ii) On C 2 , we have C(β)
We use Lemma 3.1 and the inverse G −1 . Since
) → ∞ uniformly in v > 0, and therefore m = H(β) → ∞, and is the only solution to C(β)
, therefore, using (4.15) in a second time, we get for all v > 0 :
where the o(−β) is uniform in v > 0. Since µ is not dt × dP constant,
Using (4.18), we compute for −β sufficiently large not depending on v > 0 :
Since b a (a * (β)) = o(−β) when β → −∞, the right-hand-side goes to −∞ uniformly in v > 0 when β → −∞, so that the supremum over C 2 is attained. 2
In conclusion, the maximum of I 1 over A is attained at (α,β,m) which belongs either to B or to C, and a Stackelberg equilibrium exists. Moreover ifα > 0, then (α,β,m) ∈ B and the maximum of I 1 over B is attained at (α,β,m). The equilibrium characterization given in the statement of the Proposition 3.6 then follows from Lemma 4.6.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
Let us recall (3.19) : h(uβ) − h(v(1 − β)) = S(β). By Lemma 4.1, as β goes from −∞ to +∞, the left-hand-side of this equation is increasing from h(−∞) − h(+∞) < 0 to h(+∞) − h(−∞) > 0 and is null for β = v u+v . For β < 1, we have
so that, by concavity of ϕ, the sign of S(β) is equal to the one of 1 − ϕ
Remember that when β goes from −∞ to 1, e * (β) is decreasing from +∞ to 0, ϕ and b e are concave, so
As a consequence, there exists a solution β to (3.19) . For β ≥ 0, S(β) is negative since in (3.16), the numerator is positive whereas the denominator is negative by concavity of ϕ. Hence β 0 < 0. Moreover S( We have the following result:
Proposition 5.1 Let e ≥ 0 and m ≥ 0 be given and constant, and let β * := v u+v . Then, for B e defined in (3.7), arg max a≥0 F (a) − e −uδψ(a) B e (β * , m) = ∅. Moreover, there exists optimal controls and (a, α, β, γ) is optimal if and only if it satisfies: β = β * , a ∈ arg max a≥0 F (a) − e −uδψ(a) B e (β * , m) and
with α ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0, where C e has been defined in (3.3) . Last, if δ ≥ 0, then a * > 0 and is unique.
Remark 5.1 Notice that we have β * ∈ (0, 1) and α * + γ * > 0.
Proof. Let a ≥ 0 be given for the moment, we introduce: Remark that K is the same function as the one defined in the beginning of the proof of Proposition 4.1, while for E a the term (1 + r J )(D + a) does not appear in the constraint (compared to the function E of the proof of Proposition 4.1). We will first solve, for fixed a, the problem of maximization of K on E a , following the same steps as in Section 4.1 : the optimal (α, β, γ) for the problem sup
are exactly the elements of
and the constraint is always saturated :
Then, from (5.2), using β * = v u+v , we get:
and (a) , and lim x→∞ F (x) = −∞ implies that a → F (a) − e −uδψ(a) B e (β * , m) attains its maximum on R + , either at a * = 0 or at a point where the first order condition is satisfied. More precisely, if δ ≥ 0, then it is a strictly concave function, increasing for small a, so that there exists a unique maximum a * > 0 that is the unique solution of:
If δ < 0, then the function is decreasing for small a, since ψ ′ (0) = +∞, so that a = 0 is a local maximum. So the maximum is attained either at a * = 0 or at a solution of F ′ (a) + uδB e (β * , m)ψ ′ (a)e −uδψ(a) = 0. In any case, we have characterized the optimal controls for the optimization problem of firm I. 2
Nash equilibrium
From the previous results, the proof of Proposition 3.2 follows easily.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
The first assertion is a consequence of Proposition 5.1. The characterization conditions (3.9) and (3.10) also follow from the same proposition and the optimal expressions (3.2). Thus, the only thing to check is that there exists an infinite number of solutions. Since µ s − ϕ(e) − δψ(a) > 0 for any (a, e), we have 
Stackelberg equilibrium in Situation 2, firm I is leader
The best response for firm J is given by (3.2) , but now the optimization problem for firm I has changed. We recall the continuous mappings m (3.5) , (3.6 ):
uβ(µs−ϕ•e * (β)) ds.
We are now ready to prove the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium, as stated in Proposition 3.7.
Proof of Proposition 3.7. Given β and γ, the optimal controls for firm J are given by e * and m * . Once again, since γ = 1 g ′ (m) yields a bijection betweenm andγ on R + , we only deal with m. Writing: (5.5) the optimization problem for firm I then writes:
We will prove the existence of a maximizer for this problem, and therefore of a Stackelberg equilibrium, by proving that we can restrict the set A to a compact subset. Notice first that A = ∅. Indeed, since J 2 (a, α, 1, 0) = e −vα , for any a ≥ 0 and α > 0, (a, α, 1, 0) ∈ A. In fact, one can easily check that for any a ≥ 0, β ∈ R and m ≥ 0, one can choose α large enough so that (a, α, β, m) ∈ A.
The proof will use the following lemmas very similar to Lemmas 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7. Nevertheless, we cannot deduce the following from the previous ones because the involved functions are not defined on the same spaces.
Lemma 5.1 There existsā ∈ (0, +∞) andβ ∈ R not depending on v such that the supremum over A is attained if and only if the supremum over {(a, α, β, m) ∈ A such that a ∈ [0,ā], β ∈ (−∞,β]} is attained.
Proof. We have I 2 (a, α, β, m) ≤ F (a). Since lim x→∞ F (x) = −∞ (cf. beginning of Subsection 5.2) there existsā > 0, such that the supremum over A is the same as the supremum over A ∩ {a ∈ [0,ā]}. Notice that I 2 is decreasing w.r.t.
α, so that I 2 (a, α, β, m) ≤ I 2 (a, 0, β, m). Using (4.10), we get e On the other hand, for any β ≥ 1, since e * (β) = 0, we compute:
−ρs e uβ(µs−ϕ(0)−δψ(a)) ds
Proof. Since I 2 is decreasing w.r.t. α and J 2 is continuous, if α > 0 and J 2 (a, α, β, m) < 1, then there exists ε > 0 such that
Thus in case of optimum satisfying α > 0, the constraint is saturated.
2 Lemma 5.3 In set B, α is a continuous function of (a, β, γ), so there exists a compact K ⊂ B not depending on v > 0 such that sup B I 2 = sup K I 2 , and in particular the maximum on B is attained.
Proof. Let us consider sup B I 2 . Recall the definition of C given by (3.5) . Since J 2 (a, α, β, m) = 1 on B, we have
therefore we have:
uβ µs−ϕ•e * (β) ds.
In (5.8), we have F (a) minus the product of three positive functions, the first one depending only on m, the second one only on a and the third one, k, only on β. Using (4.10), e u(m−b m (m)) → ∞ when m → ∞, therefore the first function is bounded from below by a positive constant and goes to infinity when m goes to infinity. Since a ∈ [0,ā] and ψ is bounded, the second one is also bounded from below by a positive constant. As in Lemma 4.5, we prove thatk(β) → ∞ uniformly in v > 0 when β → −∞, which concludes the proof.
2
Lemma 5.4 Assume that there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium (ê,m,â,α,β,γ) withα > 0. Then necessarilŷ
andβ is a solution of (3.19). (5.10)
Proof. The maximum on B is attained at (â,α,β,m) 
is decreasing in a neighborhood of 0, so that from (5.8),m > 0. Assume moreover thatα > 0. Then the mapping (β, m) → I 2 (â, α(â, β, m), β, m) admits a local maximum at (β,m) and therefore the first order conditions are satisfied, ie ∂/∂βI 2 (â, α(â,β,m),β,m) = ∂/∂mI 2 (â, α(â,β,m),β,m) = 0. This partial derivative with respect to m yieldŝ
On the other hand, using ϕ ′ (e * (β)) = 1 1−β , we compute:
Then:k
•e * (β)+β(µs−ϕ•e * (β))+C(β) e −ρs ds if β < 1.
As seen in Lemma 4.1, for β ≥ 1, h(uβ) − h(v(1 − β)) > 0, thereforek ′ (β) > 0 for β ≥ 1. As a consequence the equation ∂ β I =k ′ (β) = 0 admitsβ (Lemma 3.2) as a solution:
andβ is a solution of (3.19). (ii) On C 2 , we have C(β) − (1 − β)δψ(a) + e * (β) = g(m)
g ′ (m) − m = G(m). We recall that the restriction of G to (m 0 , ∞) is an increasing bijection from (m 0 , ∞) onto (G(m 0 ), ∞) ⊃ (0, ∞) and denote by G −1 its inverse. Since C(β) − (1 − β)δψ(a * (β)) + e * (β) > 0, for any β ∈ R, H(β) := G −1 C(β) − (1 − β)δψ(a) + e * (β) > 0 is well-defined. We thus have sup C2 I 2 = sup (aβ)∈[0,ā]×(−∞,β] I 2 a, 0, β, H(β) . We now prove that when β → −∞, I
2 (a, 0, β, H(β)) → −∞ uniformly in (a, v) ∈ [0,ā] × K v where K v is a given compact subset of (0, +∞). Using (4.18) and (4.19) and the continuity of C(β) in v, we obtain that for all v ∈ K v , for −β sufficiently large: Since b a (a) is bounded when a ∈ [0,ā], the last term goes to −∞ when β → −∞ uniformly in a ∈ [0,ā], so that the supremum over C 2 is attained.
2
End of the proof of Proposition 3.7.
In conclusion, the maximum over A is attained, either on B or C, and a Stackelberg equilibrium exists. Moreover if α > 0, then we have the characterization given in the statement of Proposition.
Remark 5.2 Notice that I 2 is not in general concave w.r.t β or γ. Consider for example b m (x) = x 0.8 /0.8 and g(x) = x 0.5 /0.5. Proof. Indeed, using Lemma 5.2, for any a ≥ 0, the mapping φ a : (β, γ) → I 2 (a, α(a, β, γ), β, γ) attains its maximum on R × R + (we allow here α(a, β, γ) to be negative). The derivative of the application m → m−b m (m), m → 1−(b m ) ′ (m) ∼ −∞ in a neighborhood of 0, so that this maximum is attained only at points such that γ > 0. As a consequence, the first order conditions are satisfied and therefore using Lemma 5.3, any global maximum (β, γ) satisfies (5.9)-(5.10), and in particular is unique since (3.19) admits a unique solution. Thus, (β,γ) is the only global maximum of φ a on R × R + (for any a ≥ 0). Then, since I 2 is decreasing w.r.t α (Lemma 5.1) we have: sup and any maximum of the second problem satisfies α = α(a, β, γ) ie I 2 (a, α, β, γ) = 1. Therefore, for any a ≥ 0, the second problem also admits a unique maximizer which is (α(a,β,γ),β,γ). Let us write:
A := (a, α, β, γ) ∈ R + × R × R × R + ; J 2 (a, α, β, γ) ≤ 1 .
It is immediate that A ⊂Ã. Sinceα = α(â,β,γ) > 0 it is then clear that the only Stackelberg equilibria are the one stated at the beginning of this Corollary. In particular, if δ ≥ 0, they are unique. In Situation 2, we can express the Nash equilibrium aŝ We prove Proposition 3.3 about the respective dependence of the initial investmentsâ 1 andâ 2 in Situations 1 and 2 on r J and r I :
